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ABSTRACT
What impact do social preferences have in market-type settings where individuals can sort in response
to relative prices? We show that sorting behavior can distinguish between individuals who like to share
and those who share but prefer to avoid the sharing environment altogether. In four laboratory experiments,
prices and social preferences interact to determine the composition of sharing environments: Costless
sorting reduces the number of sharers, even after inducing positive reciprocity. Subsidized sharing
increases entry, but mainly by the least generous sharers. Costly sharing reduces entry, but attracts
those who share generously. We discuss implications for real-world giving with sorting.
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Social preferences have been shown to strongly affect individual behavior both in the la-
boratory, e.g., in dictator games, and in the field, e.g., for charitable giving (for reviews of the 
vast literature see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, and Andreoni, 2006). A large prior literature provides 
evidence of specific types of social preferences, such as pure or impure altruism and reciprocity, 
and links these preferences to sharing behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). The existence, or even 
prevalence, of certain types of social preferences, however, does not immediately imply that they 
are an important determinant of real-world sharing behavior. If individuals have the opportunity 
to sort between different economic environments that do and do not allow sharing and face dif-
ferent prices for entering these environments, the impact of social preferences will depend on 
how different types sort in response to the relative prices. For example, some of the most popular 
fundraising methods (door-to-door, donor lists, phone solicitation) involve being directly ap-
proached by the fundraiser, which makes it hard to avoid the giving request. In response, opt-out 
techniques such as do-not-call lists have become increasingly popular, leaving the fundraisers 
with a restricted and self-selected set of individuals that they can approach.
1 
In this paper, we show that sorting strongly affects which social preferences are present 
in a given economic environment. As a result, the observed sharing behavior depends on who 
sorts into or out of the environment. We also show that relative prices for entry can be used to 
significantly alter sorting and, hence, the compositional effects. Sorting and its interaction with 
prices allow us to distinguish between individuals who obtain positive utility from sharing (e.g., 
due to pure or impure altruism) and those who share if asked (e.g., due to social pressure) but 
who would prefer not to be in such a situation in the first place. The differential sorting behavior 
of these social-preference types explains why average amounts shared differ dramatically in en-
vironments with and without sorting, and depending on the price of sorting. Similar to Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), we find that the heterogeneity of social preferences interacts in important ways 
with the economic environment. However, while Fehr and Schmidt (1999) focus on the interac-
tion between different types – e.g. a selfish player inducing inequity-averse players to act self-
ishly – we illustrate that sorting suffices to produce samples (and behavior) that look very differ-
ent than in an unbiased sampling of all social-preference types.  
                                                 
1 According to the 2009 Economic Report of the President (Box 9-1), 72 percent of Americans were registered with 
National Do Not Call program as of 2007.   2
Our point is intuitively evident when considering examples from the field, where envi-
ronments with the greatest opportunities for charitable behavior attract very different people than 
a representative sample of the population. For example, many foreigners incurred significant 
costs to reach Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. These people were non-representative of the 
broad populations, and likely included the most generous types. At the same time, disaster areas 
also disproportionately attract those who are least likely to behave pro-socially, such as looters 
and profiteers. On a less dramatic scale, tourists who visit poor countries include those who care 
about the locals and look for opportunities to help, but also those who do not care at all and enjoy 
the low prices. Others, who feel obligated to help if asked but do so reluctantly, avoid these 
countries altogether. In the economics literature, the importance of sorting among different so-
cial-preference types has been shown in the context of charitable giving and blood donations. In 
the fundraising experiments in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2010), many donors who give 
in door-to-door campaigns prefer to avoid the interaction with the fundraiser and not give. The 
same holds for a request to answer a survey, and the strength of the sorting effect varies consid-
erably by financial incentives. Similarly, Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2009) illustrate the strong 
impact of financial incentives on sorting among blood donors. 
To better understand the effects of sorting and entry prices on sharing, we distinguish 
three classes of social preferences, based on observed sharing behavior. First, “willing sharers” 
share a positive amount and seek the opportunity to do so. Second, “reluctant sharers” share but 
prefer to avoid the sharing environment. Third, “non-sharers” simply never share. These three 
classes comprise a variety of social preferences discussed in the literature. For example, “willing 
sharers” might be motivated by pure or impure (warm-glow) altruism (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; 
Andreoni, 1989 and 1990), or by self-signaling (Bodner and Prelec, 2002; Benabou and Tirole, 
2006; Grossman, 2009). “Reluctant sharers” may share, if asked to, because they feel shame, 
guilt, or social pressure to conform to a request (Milgram, 1963; Bernheim, 1994; Tadelis, 2008; 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Dillenberger and Sadowski, 
forthcoming). “Non-sharers” might have “classical” self-interested preferences, or they may feel 
social pressure to give but are able to resist the pressure. Our coarse distinction, based on ob-
served behavior, suffices to generate predictions about differential sorting as the price for entry 
varies, and about the resulting sample composition. 
The analysis consists of four laboratory experiments that use variants of the dictator   3
game, including a double-dictator game intended to induce positive and negative reciprocity. In 
each experiment, we measure how much of an endowment w participants voluntarily share. Each 
experiment has a treatment in which participants are allowed to sort out of the game, thus receiv-
ing a fixed payment w’ and leaving the potential recipient uninformed about the game. This de-
sign mimics situations in which a potential giver chooses whether to enter an environment in 
which sharing is possible, and the potential recipient becomes aware of the possible interaction 
only if entry occurs. We manipulate the price of entering the sharing environment by varying the 
endowment in the dictator game (w) relative to the outside option (w’).  
Experiment 1 provides the baseline set-up for the subsequent three experiments. Here, we 
introduce sorting into a dictator game, similar to Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006). We find that 
costless sorting (w = w’) reduces the number of sharers by half, implying that giving is utility-
decreasing for at least half of the givers in standard dictator games. Surprisingly, sorting also af-
fects the most generous sharers, suggesting that observed generosity is not a good indicator of 
utility from giving. The sorting effect is robust across geographic locations and within demo-
graphic subsamples. In fact, sorting has considerably greater economical and statistical predic-
tive power than any demographic characteristic, including social background and charitable giv-
ing. 
Experiment 2 tests whether a strengthened motivation for sharing helps to overcome the 
sorting effect. Several researchers note that reciprocity is a strong motive for generous behavior 
relative to other motives such as altruism (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Sobel 2005; Cox, Friedman 
and Gjerstad 2007). We ask whether reciprocity is strong enough to mitigate reluctance in shar-
ing and therefore prevent individuals from opting out. For example, if small gifts (e.g., address 
stickers) increase the willingness of donors to give to a charity, does this increase in giving per-
sist if the donor has the opportunity to avoid the request for giving? We employ a double-dictator 
game, in which the ultimate recipient first decides about sharing $2 with the ultimate dictator, 
not knowing about the subsequent $10 dictator game.
2 We find that positive reciprocity, induced 
by the recipient initially sharing money, increases giving relative to the baseline (single) dictator 
game and that the increase persists after we introduce sorting, relative to a single dictator game 
                                                 
2 Differently from the two-part dictator games in Ben-Ner et al. (2004), we use a “mini”-dictator game in the first 
stage to distinguish reciprocity from distributional preferences (e.g., inequity aversion). We are also careful to com-
pare the behavior in the double-dictator game to a baseline dictator game, rather than comparing behavior within the 
double-dictator game, thus avoiding issues of mis-identifying unconditional kindness as reciprocity (see Cox, 2004).   4
with sorting. However, comparing double-dictator games with and without sorting, we also con-
tinue to find a significant decrease in giving under sorting, very similar in size to the sorting ef-
fect in the single-dictator game. Thus, positive reciprocity does not eliminate reluctance to share. 
We also find that negative reciprocity (induced by receiving $0 out of $2) virtually eliminates 
giving in the setting with sorting and induces some people not to sort out and to then share zero. 
Next, we introduce price effects. We test whether relative entry prices for settings with 
and without sharing affect the differential sorting of individuals with different social preferences. 
In Experiment 3, we subsidize entry into the sharing environment. That is, we make the dictator 
game financially more attractive relative to the outside option (w > w’). As a result, all “willing 
sharers” and “non-sharers” should enter; but, among the “reluctant sharers,” only those should 
enter for whom the additional endowment w – w’ more than offsets the disutility from being 
pressured (or shamed) into giving. We find that the subsidy leads to greater entry into the sharing 
environment and a higher aggregate amount shared. However, it disproportionately attracts those 
who share the least – non-sharers and the least generous reluctant sharers. As a result, the intro-
duction of a small subsidy lowers the average amount shared among entrants. Thus, subsidies 
intended to induce individuals to share may have weak effects since they attract those who share 
the least. 
Experiment 3 also utilizes a within-subject design, in which we confront subjects with in-
creasingly higher subsidies. This accomplishes two goals. First, we can show directly that those 
reluctant sharers who share the most in a standard dictator game (without sorting) are least will-
ing to re-enter the dictator game; they return only for very high subsidies. Second, we use the 
within-subjects data to classify social-preference types more precisely, relative to the between-
subjects design in Experiment 1, where we observe each individual only once. 
Experiment 4 increases the cost of entry into the sharing environment relative to the out-
side option (w < w’). As a result, all non-sharers and reluctant sharers should opt out. Among 
willing sharers only those who obtain a high utility from giving should enter. We find that few 
subjects enter, but those subjects share substantially. While the aggregate amount shared is low 
since few subjects enter, the average amount shared by those who enter is significantly higher 
than in standard dictator games. Hence, with a cost of entry, the sharing environment attracts 
primarily those who share the most. 
Our results show that the role of social preferences is significantly affected by the pres-  5
ence of sorting opportunities and by relative prices for sorting. One conclusion from the findings 
is that in generalizing from experiments on social preferences to the field, one should account for 
the possible effects of individuals sorting between environments that allow different kinds of so-
cial acts.
3 In the field, individuals sort into and out of environments based on preferences and 
prices. Thus, individuals who participate in a market are unlikely to be a random sample of the 
population.
4 Our experiments provide one example of how market-like features of an economic 
environment can significantly alter the observed behavior. However, rather than asking whether 
the same person displays different social preferences in a “standard” laboratory game than in a 
game that incorporates market features (e.g., starts to display less pro-social behavior when the 
framing changes as in List, 2006), we argue that the changing sample composition alone ac-
counts for significant changes in observed behavior. 
In addition, sorting helps identify social preferences. In an environment where opting out 
is difficult, an individual may appear to be a willing sharer, but may actually prefer to avoid 
sharing if possible. While our paper does not aim towards nor can pin down the exact prefer-
ences underlying “reluctant sharing,”
5 it reveals that looking at behavior across environments 
with and without sorting helps distinguish different motives. In this sense, our first baseline ex-
periment closely relates to the results of Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) who demonstrate that 
roughly one third of individuals prefer to receive $9 instead of playing a dictator game over $10 
with an anonymous recipient. Similarly, Broberg, Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007) elicit reserva-
tion prices for exiting the dictator game and find that roughly two-thirds of subjects are willing to 
accept less than 100 percent of the dictator endowment in order to opt out. However, while Dana 
et al. and Broberg et al. are interested in the motivation for giving and the question of whether 
                                                 
3 Related studies have addressed the role of sorting in other contexts such as prisoner’s dilemma and public goods 
games (Bohnet and Kübler 2005; Ahn, Isaac and Salmon 2008), the choice of reward and punishment institutions 
(Gürerk et al., 2006; Sutter, Kocher, and Haigner 2006; Botelho, Harrison, Pinto, and Rutström, 2005), incentive 
contracts (Eriksson and Villeval, 2004; Dohmen and Falk, 2006), auctions (Palfrey and Pevnitskaya, 2008), risky 
choices (Harrison, Lau and Rutström, forthcoming), partner selection in trust and dictator games (Slonim and Gar-
barino 2008), and entry into competitive environments (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Bartling et al. 2010).. 
4 Critics have questioned whether experimental results based on samples selected among college students apply to 
“real people” performing “real tasks” (cf. Harrison and List, 2004). Many such criticisms have been successfully 
addressed, for example by replicating experiments with higher stakes (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Cam-
eron, 1999; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva, 2002) or with professionals (see the 
overview in Harrison and List (2004), Section 4). The point of our paper is different. Rather than arguing that the 
samples are too narrow to reflect the overall population, we ask whether their selection is too broad to make infer-
ences about the field. In addition, we demonstrate the potential of experiments to analyze sorting directly. 
5 This is the focus of Dana et al. (2006) and (2007) and Benabou and Tirole (2006), among others.   6
some subjects are willing to pay to avoid the dictator game, we focus on the effect of sorting, in-
teracted with price variation. We ask which social-preference types take advantage of the sorting 
option and what effect such sorting has on the composition of and behavior in the resulting shar-
ing environment.
6 Thus, although previous experimental evidence demonstrates that at least 
some sharing is “reluctant” or “involuntary,” we go further in demonstrating how sorting and the 
price of sorting interact with such preferences to yield sharing outcomes that look different than 
the standard dictator game result.
7 
II. Predictions: Sorting and sharing under heterogeneous social preferences 
Consider an agent who enters one of two possible economic settings, one with sharing 
opportunity and one without. In the sharing environment, the agent is endowed with an amount w 
and can divide w into a payoff for herself (x) and a payoff for another agent (y). In the environ-
ment without a sharing opportunity, the agent receives a possibly different amount w’, and the 
other agent receives nothing (y=0). We allow the agent’s utility to depend on the payoffs x and y 
as well as on the environment, D, U = U(D, x, y), where D equals 1 if the environment allows 
sharing and 0 otherwise.
8 In this framework, a sorting option means that the agent can choose 
between the environment with and without a sharing opportunity. Note that an agent who choos-
es to be in an environment obtains the same utility as an agent exogenously assigned to such an 
environment, holding payoffs constant.
9 We define the proportion shared in the sharing environ-
ment to be a = y / (x + y). 
We distinguish three types of social preferences, based on the observed behavior with and 
without sorting. First, some individuals share a positive amount if in the sharing environment, 
                                                 
6 Broberg et al.’s (2007) data allows exploring some of the hypotheses we consider here, regarding the effects of 
prices on sorting, which they do not analyze in their paper. In Appendix 2, we re-examine their data and find strong 
support for our novel predictions. 
7 Another related strand of the experimental literature shows that subjects’ willingness to share declines when they 
have “earned” their endowment, e.g., by exerting effort (see, for example, Rutström and Williams, 2000, and Cher-
ry, Fryckblom, and Shogren, 2002). These findings imply, similar to the results in this paper, that the desire to max-
imize one’s own payoff may be more prevalent than earlier experiments indicate once we account for a “real-world” 
feature, here, the fact that people typically earn their income. Also related is the experimental literature showing that 
subjects’ willingness to share can be reversed when allowing them to take money from their matched partners (e.g., 
Bardsley, 2008, and Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008). 
8 By including only “own payoff” and “others’ payoff,” we implicitly assume narrow framing. That is, the agent 
does not consider payoffs or wealth beyond payoffs from the current decision. 
9 Alternatively, agents may obtain lower utility when choosing to avoid the sharing opportunity than when being 
exogenously assigned to the non-sharing environment, e.g., disutility from (self-)signaling that they prefer not to 
face the request to share. If such effects exist, our experiments underestimate the extent of reluctant sharing.   7
w x w x U w x < − ∈ ) , , 1 ( max arg ] , 0 [ , and they prefer to be in such an environment when w = w’, i.e., 
) , , 1 ( max ] , 0 [ x w x U w x − ∈ ) 0 , , 0 ( w U > . This type, which we term “willing sharer,” derives utility 
from sharing and enters (and shares in) a dictator game whenever the cost of entering the game is 
less than or equal to zero. These social preferences may include a range of sharing motives, such 
as pure and impure altruism and inequity aversion (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
The second type shares a positive amount, w x w x U w x < − ∈ ) , , 1 ( max arg ] , 0 [ , but prefers not 
to have the option to share when there is no monetary reward:  ) , , 1 ( max ] , 0 [ x w x U w x − ∈ < 
) 0 , , 0 ( w U . We refer to this type as “reluctant sharer.” This type may share, for example, due to 
social pressure to comply with a sharing norm, out of shame or guilt at not sharing, due to (nar-
row) inequity aversion that is not felt when opting out, or due to “emotional altruism,” i.e., not 
wanting to hurt the other person’s feelings by saying no to a sharing request. We do not distin-
guish between these explanations. Our goal is simply to detect the reluctance to share, using the 
sorting option, to assess its magnitude and responsiveness to the price of sorting.  
For reluctant sharers, we also investigate whether they not only prefer to opt out 
whenever the cost is zero (w = w’), but may even be willing to incur a positive cost (w < w’) to 
avoid sharing. We sometimes restrict attention to the special case where a sufficient condition for 
) , , 1 ( max ] , 0 [ x w x U w x − ∈ <  ) 0 , ' , 0 ( w U  is that the relative decrease in endowment (w -w’)/w that a 
reluctant sharer will accept to avoid the sharing environment altogether is given by (w -w’)/w 
= f(a), where a is the proportion shared in the sharing environment and f some general function 
such that f’ > 0. This implies that, among reluctant sharers, those who share the most in the shar-
ing environment are also willing to pay the most to avoid the sharing environment. We refer to 
this condition as “relative sharing aversion:” the most generous reluctant sharers are least willing 
to enter the environment where sharing is possible.
10 
The third type does not share, even if the environment allows for sharing:  ] , 0 [ max arg w x∈  
w x w x U = − ) , , 1 ( . We call this type “non-sharer.” Most straightforward, we can interpret non-
                                                 
10 A modified Cobb-Douglas utility function, described in Appendix 1, which allows for utility from sharing for 
reluctant sharers, also has this property. Relative sharing aversion also obtains under the simple assumption that the 
utility of reluctant sharers is determined solely by their own monetary payoff. Relative sharing aversion is, however, 
not a logical necessity. For example, a person might be close to indifferent between sharing or not, preferring to 
avoid sharing, but once in the sharing environment chooses to share a great deal. Another, who detests sharing, 
might part with only a few pennies in the sharing environment, but bears tremendous embarrassment from doing so. 
The second might pay more to avoid the sharing environment than the first.   8
sharers as standard economic agents who derive utility from their own payoff and are not af-
fected by the presence of a sharing opportunity:  ) 0 , , 0 ( ) 0 , , 1 ( ) , , 1 ( max ] , 0 [ w U w U x w x U w x = = − ∈ .
11 
Holding the endowment constant, they are indifferent between environments with and without 
sharing, and we have no prediction about their sorting when w = w’.
12 When the sharing envi-
ronment yields a greater payoff (w > w’), however, we predict that they enter (and share zero).  
Based on the above three kinds of social preferences, we can generate simple predictions 
about sharing and sorting behavior and its interaction with prices. The first prediction deals with 
the impact of reluctant sharers if sorting is possible at no cost: 
Prediction 1: The introduction of a sorting option in a sharing environment, with equal endow-
ment in the environment without sharing (w = w’), reduces the aggregate amount shared.  
This follows immediately from the fact that reluctant sharers opt out of the sharing environment 
when costless sorting is introduced (w = w’) and the assumption that the sorting option does not 
affect the behavior of willing shares or of non-sharers. 
Prediction 1 also gives rise to the question of whether stronger motives for sharing reduce 
the sorting effect. For example, if an initial kind act by the recipient yields more sharing, will 
sorting still affect sharing to the same extent? Given that reciprocity is often interpreted as in-
creasing subjects’ utility from giving, one may expect a higher fraction of subjects to be willing 
sharers and, hence, the fraction opting out to decrease relative to the baseline case with no recip-
rocity. If the inducement of reciprocity instead increases the social pressure to give, the fraction 
of reluctant sharers and, hence, the fraction opting out might increase.  
The next two predictions deal with changes in the composition of self-selected individu-
als in the sharing environment as the cost of entering changes.  
Prediction 2: Entry into the sharing environment increases in the size of the subsidy w – w’. Un-
der relative sharing aversion, entry is decreasing in the portion agents share (a). 
First, since willing sharers enter even when the subsidy is zero, and all non-sharers enter at any 
                                                 
11 An additional condition that prevents any change in choice of x between sharing and non-sharing environments is 
) , , 0 ( ) , , 1 ( 2 2 x w x U x w x U − = −  and  x x w x U x w x U ∀ − = − ) , , 0 ( ) , , 1 ( 3 3 . 
12 Alternatively, non-sharers may derive disutility from social pressure or guilt etc. like reluctant sharers, but are 
able to resist the pressure to share. Such “reluctant non-sharers” opt out even if the endowment is identical in both 
environments, i.e., they prefer not to be asked to share,  < ) 0 , , 1 ( w U ) 0 , , 0 ( w U . Neglecting this type of “reluctance” 
results in its underestimation and makes our estimates of the relevance of sorting more conservative.   9
positive subsidy, the prediction of increasing entry depends only on the behavior of the reluctant 
sharers, who opt into the sharing environment when  ) , , 1 ( max ] , 0 [ x w x U w x − ∈ >) 0 , ' , 0 ( w U . The 
larger is w, the more likely is this condition to hold. Second, under relative sharing aversion, the 
condition of indifference between the two environments is (w -w’)/ w = f(a), with f’ > 0. Thus, for 
any given w and w’, individuals with lower values of a are most likely to opt into the sharing en-
vironment. Those with the highest values of a are most likely to opt out. Intuitively, those reluc-
tant sharers who share the most, if asked, have the most to gain from avoiding the sharing envi-
ronment. As a result, reluctant sharers’ generosity, conditional on giving, is a negative predictor 
of their inclination to enter the sharing environment. 
Prediction 3 considers the opposite pricing differential.  
Prediction 3: Making the sharing environment costly relative to the outside option (w < w’) de-
creases entry and the aggregate amount shared but, for some cost, increases average sharing 
among those who opt into the sharing environment. 
Costly sharing induces both the non-sharers and the reluctant sharers to sort out. Among 
the willing sharers only those remain who care a lot about the ability to share, i.e., about the pay-
off of the other person. Hence, while it is clear that aggregate sharing decreases, we expect the 
conditional average amount shared to be high. Conditional sharing will be strictly higher if the 
subset of willing sharers who enter at any given cost w’ – w share at least as much, on average, 
as the non-sharers, reluctant sharers, and those willing sharers who opt out.  
We now have a series of predictions that can be borne out or refuted by experimental evi-
dence. The next sections present experiments testing these predictions. 
III. Experiment 1 – Costless Sorting 
Experiment 1 uses a between-subjects design to compare outcomes in dictator games 
without and with sorting, holding constant the endowment (w = w’). It provides the general set-
up for the tests in Experiments 2-4.
13 
A. Experimental Design 
Experiment 1 was conducted at Barcelona and Berkeley with students of the Universitat 
                                                 
13 Experiment 1 generalizes the dictator game in Dana et al. (2006) and shifts the emphasis to sorting effects and 
their heterogeneity across different social-preference types rather than on determining the “average” underlying so-
cial preferences. We also add to their findings by showing the persistence of sorting across demographic subgroups.   10
Pompeu Fabra (UPF), the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), and UC Berkeley. We 
conducted 16 sessions, eight in each city and each lasting 20 to 25 minutes, with an even number 
of 10 to 36 participants. In total, 336 subjects participated (154 in Barcelona, 182 in Berkeley): 
166 subjects (83 dictators) in the treatment without sorting and 170 (85 dictators) with sorting.
  
Upon arrival, subjects were told that they would receive a participation fee (€5 in Barce-
lona
14 and $5 in Berkeley) and that they might earn additional money. Subjects randomly drew 
participant numbers, which determined their role. One-half of the subjects, the recipients, were 
asked to complete a brief questionnaire, for which they would not receive any additional pay-
ment, and to then wait quietly. The other half, the dictators, were located in a separate room and 
received instructions, both in writing and aloud.
 15 These instructions varied by treatment. 
No-Sorting Treatment. In dictator games without sorting, dictators were asked to divide 
€10 (Barcelona) or $10 (Berkeley) with a randomly and anonymously matched subject in the 
other room. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter would describe the game to the par-
ticipants in the other room and show each of them how much money they received. Each dictator 
received an envelope with a sheet indicating the number of the paired recipient. Dictators wrote 
their own participant number on the sheet and indicated a division of the endowment in incre-
ments of 10 (Barcelona) or 25 (Berkeley) cents. The experimenter then collected the envelopes 
and asked the dictators to complete the same one-page questionnaire as the recipients.  
Sorting Treatment. In the games with sorting, dictators decided – in addition – whether 
to “participate.” They received two envelopes, labeled “participate” and “don’t participate.” If 
they chose to participate, they had to open the envelope marked “participate,” containing the 
sheet with the participant number of the paired recipient. They would record their own number, 
and specify a division. If they chose not to participate, they received $10 (€10) without the op-
tion to divide the money. In that case, they had to open the envelope marked “don’t participate” 
(which did not contain a matched participant number) and write only their participant number on 
the sheet inside.
16 After collecting the envelopes, the experimenter separated receivers matched 
with participating and non-participating dictators. For those matched with non-participating dic-
                                                 
14 At the time the sessions were conducted €1 was worth about $1.28. 
15 Instructions and materials for experiments at both locations are in Appendix 3. Instructions for the remaining ex-
periments are similar, except for the specified treatment differences. The Barcelona sessions were conducted in 
Spanish (Castilian); the instructions are translated into English. The entire dataset is available from the authors. 
16 The procedure ensured that subjects participating and not participating wrote roughly the same amount on the 
sheets, thus preserving anonymity.    11
tators, the experiment ended and these subjects received only the $5 (€5) participation fee. Those 
paired with participating dictators received a description of the dictator game, and saw the sheet 
informing them of how much they had been anonymously given. 
The questionnaire, administered in both treatments, asked for detailed demographics. We 
also asked about social preferences (donations to charity during the past year), risk preferences 
(like or dislike of risks), and how many people “in the other room” a subject knew. In Berkeley, 
we added the question “Why did you decide to share (or not share) the amount you did in the ex-
perimental task today? If applicable, why did you decide not to participate?”  
B. Results 
Experiment 1 allows us to test whether sorting decreases the aggregate amount shared 
and to infer the relative frequencies of reluctant and willing sharers (Prediction 1). We can also 
draw inferences about the relative generosity of reluctant and willing sharers. 
Figures 1A and 1B show the distributions of amounts shared, and the frequencies of sub-
jects who opt out of the sharing environment, separately for Barcelona and Berkeley. Without 
sorting, sharing is comparable to previous experiments, €1.87 on average in Barcelona and $2.00 
in Berkeley. Most subjects share a positive amount (60 percent in Barcelona, 64 percent in 
Berkeley). However, the introduction of sorting strongly decreases the average amount shared, to 
€0.58 in Barcelona and to $1.21 in Berkeley. Both decreases are statistically significant in a non-
parametric rank-sum test (Barcelona: z = 3.39, p < 0.001; Berkeley: z = 2.34, p = 0.02). As pre-
dicted, and consistent with previous results, many subjects choose to opt out, 72 percent in Bar-
celona and 50 percent in Berkeley, with the difference between locations being statistically sig-
nificant in a non-parametric chi-squared test (χ
2(1) = 4.18, p = 0.04). 
Our data allows estimating the relative frequencies of the three postulated social-
preference types. Non-sharers are those who do not share in the No Sorting treatment, 35 percent 
of the overall sample (33 percent in Barcelona, 36 percent in Berkeley). Willing sharers are those 
who share in the Sorting treatment, 32 percent overall (28 percent in Barcelona, 38 percent in 
Berkeley). Reluctant sharers make up the remaining 33 percent (39 percent in Barcelona, 26 per-
cent in Berkeley), implicitly sharing in the No Sorting treatment, but not in the Sorting treatment.  
Table 1 confirms the statistical significance of our findings in a linear regression and in a 
tobit estimation for the percentage of the endowment shared, and in a probit estimation for the   12
frequency of sharing.
17 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and, in the linear regres-
sions, adjusted for small-sample bias.
18 Under all estimation procedures, sorting significantly re-
duces sharing, and the effect is similar across cities (insignificantly larger in Barcelona).  
In addition, the distributions of giving with and without sorting reveals that many of the 
givers affected by the sorting option are rather generous. To assess the distributional effects, we 
estimate seven separate linear regressions with an indicator for each giving bin from Figures 1A 
and B as the independent variables and an indicator for Sorting as the main explanatory variable. 
We pool the Berkeley and Barcelona data, neglecting currency differences, and include zero giv-
ing after opting out in the 0.00 bin. To maximize efficiency, we control for the full set of socio-
economic survey variables and for the sites, Berkeley, Pompeu Fabra, and Autonoma. (The re-
sulting eleven individual characteristics are listed in Table 2.) The coefficient estimates of the 
Sorting indicator and the 95% confidence intervals (using bias-corrected robust standard errors 
(HC3)) are displayed in Figure 1C. Sorting significantly increases the percentage of subjects giv-
ing zero, by 33.7%. The biggest and most significant negative shifts occur for giving between 3 
and 4 (–10.0%, p-value = 0.021) and between 4 and 5 (–12.2%, p-value = 0.046).
19 This latter 
finding provides evidence that sorting matters even for the subset of relatively generous givers. 
A large fraction of those who share generously do so reluctantly.  
                                                 
17 The distributions of amounts given in Figures 1A and 1B suggest a tobit model to account for the $0 corner solu-
tion. Note that the use of a hurdle model (see Mullahy 1986) to account for the two-step decision – whether to par-
ticipate and, if participating, how much to give – is not appropriate here. The hurdle model generalizes the Tobit 
model in allowing two separate stochastic processes to determine participation and, conditional on participation, the 
amount given. However, unlike the data typically analyzed with hurdle models (including previous work related to 
dictator games, e.g., Erkal et al., forthcoming), our data contains two distinct processes generating zero sharing: opt-
ing out and opting in but sharing zero. A standard hurdle model would treat all zeros as determined by a single bi-
nary process. This is, at best, unnecessary since we directly observe the two processes generating zero, and would 
need to be accounted for by extending the first stage to a bivariate probit. More likely, this approach is problematic 
since the focus of our experiments is to analyze specifically the implication of allowing for two different types of 
zeros for the composition of the sharing environment. Moreover, while we often examine the first-stage decision 
separately, as in a hurdle model, our analysis of the resulting sharing in the second stage focuses on conditional shar-
ing. 
18 Following MacKinnon and White (1985), we use the residual-variance estimator HC3, which approximates a 
jackknife estimator. Similarly, in the tobit model, we perform a jackknife estimation, which produces slightly more 
conservative standard errors than the robust variance estimator. If we clustered by session, standard errors in this and 
in all other estimations are very similar and typically slightly smaller, though unlikely to be reliable given the few 
clusters (16 sessions in this table, fewer in other estimations). 
19 The reduction in giving between 0 and 1 is also relatively large and marginally significant (–9.3%, p-value = 
0.083). The results are very similar under various alternative sample splits into different giving bins. For example, if 
we equalize bin size to 7-8% of subjects (other than the large, non-separable bin of subjects giving $0) and split into 
0.00, (0.00-1.00), 1.00, (1.00-2.00], (2.00-3.50], (3.50-4.50], and more than 4.50, the largest significant reductions in 
sharing come from the bins of 1.00, (3.50-4.50], and more than 4.50. Quantile regressions confirm the same pattern, 
though they cannot be estimated for the lower quantiles due to the mass point at zero of the dependent variable.   13
We gauge the importance and robustness of sorting by relating it to other determinants of 
sharing. Table 2 compares the effect of sorting on the percentage shared (Column 1) to the effect 
of the demographics and self-reported preferences from the survey (Column 2) in a simple linear 
framework, again with bias-corrected robust standard errors. While the effect of sorting is highly 
significant and large (–10 percent), all other dummy coefficients are smaller in absolute size, and 
only one enters significantly. The results are very similar when including both the sorting dum-
my and the individual characteristics (Column 3).
20 Overall, sorting is significantly more impor-
tant than any of the individual characteristics in determining sharing behavior. 
A second way to measure the importance of sorting is the portion of explained variance. 
In the regression with only Sorting as the independent variable (Column 1), the adjusted R
2 is 
0.07; in the regression with the 11 individual characteristics (Column 2), it is only 0.03. That is, 
the observable characteristics explain only half as much variance as sorting alone, once we ac-
count for the effect of merely adding predictors.
21 More directly, we calculate the coefficients of 
partial determination in the regression including both sorting and demographic dummies, shown 
to the right of the standard errors in Column 3. The partial R
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individual characteristic explains between 0.01 and 0.18 of the remaining unexplained variance, 
but sorting explains 0.28. Thus, the sorting variable not only has an economically and statisti-
cally larger effect, but also is a more reliable predictor of sharing than any other variable.
22 
Overall, Experiment 1 provides evidence not all sharing is the result of people wanting to 
share. Instead, reluctant sharers and (some) non-sharers take advantage of the costless sorting 
option.
23 Surprisingly, the largest and most significant reductions in giving in a setting with a 
                                                 
20 All findings are highly robust to alternative regression specifications such as refinements of the dummies for age, 
social class, or major (though a higher number of controls risks saturating the model). 
21 The adjusted R
2 is calculated as 1 – (1 – R
2)•[(N – 1)/(N – K – 1)], where N is the number of observations and K 
the number of predictors. 
22 We also check the robustness of the sorting effect across different subgroups of subjects. For each demographic 
characteristic (subsamples by gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, age, siblings), including educational choices 
(major, university), and for the elicited preferences (donations, risk preferences), we calculate the average amount 
shared in the treatment without sorting and the treatment with sorting. The results are displayed in Appendix Figure 
1. In all but one of the 20 subgroups, the average amount shared without sorting (left bars) is lower than the average 
amount shared with sorting (right bars). Thus, our baseline result is not only robust to the inclusion of individual 
characteristics as controls, but also pervasive throughout all categorizations by such characteristics. 
23 Among those who chose to enter the dictator game, 21 percent (7 of 34) gave nothing to the recipient. This repre-
sents 8 percent of the total population, including those who opted out. Recall that the existence of such behavior is 
consistent with our interpretation of “non-sharers” as being indifferent between entering and not entering when w = 
w’. Alternatively, it is also consistent with the broader definition, including “reluctant non-sharers.”   14
sorting opportunity compared to one without occur among relatively generous givers, who share 
$3-$5. This finding is a first indication that generosity in sharing does not necessarily imply high 
utility from sharing, which we explore in more detail in subsequent experiments. 
IV. Experiment 2: Sorting and Reciprocity 
Does the powerful effect of sorting persist under stronger motives for sharing? The next 
experiment tests the role of sorting in the presence of positive reciprocity. Generous behavior is 
often observed most strongly in contexts where the other party has previously done something 
kind, suggesting that individual “willingness” to share might be greater in such instances (for 
reviews of evidence on reciprocity, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Sobel (2005); for theoreti-
cal discussions of reciprocity, see Rabin (1995), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), and Cox, Fried-
man and Gjerstad (2007)).  
We conducted a reciprocity variant of the dictator game, a “double dictator game.” In 
measuring reciprocity, we aim to avoid confounds with other social preferences, as cautioned by 
Cox (2004),
24 and in particular, to distinguish reciprocity from distributional preferences (e.g., 
inequity aversion). To this end, we used a “mini”-dictator game in the first stage and compare the 
behavior in the (second-stage) $10-dictator game to the $10-dictator game from Experiment 1, in 
which there was no room for reciprocity.  
In our first-stage mini-dictator game, we gave the recipients an initial choice of sharing 
$2 with a matched partner in the other room. After finding out how much of the $2 was shared, 
the matched partner played a $10 dictator game with the same person. Subjects did not know, 
initially, that their matched partners would subsequently become dictators over $10.
25 We con-
ducted the experiment both without sorting and with sorting at the beginning of the second-stage 
$10-dictator game. In order to test whether sorting affects sharing less after inducing reciprocity, 
we compare the effect of sorting in simple dictator games (Experiment 1) with its effect in the 
second stage of the double-dictator games (Experiment 2).
26 If positive reciprocity turns reluctant 
                                                 
24 See also Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), who suggest that what is sometimes interpreted as reciprocity may be 
a strengthened “guilt aversion” induced by the first-mover’s kind act and its effect on expectations. 
25 Initial voluntary sharing can thus be interpreted as an act of kindness, rather than an attempt to induce reciprocal 
behavior, which avoids concerns about interpreting the dictators’ reaction as reciprocity (Cox, 2004).  
26 By primarily comparing the behavior in the double-dictator game to a baseline dictator game, rather than compar-
ing behavior within the double-dictator game, we avoid mis-identifying unconditional kindness as reciprocity (see 
Cox, 2004). 
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sharers into willing sharers, there should be a smaller decrease in sharing (due to opting out) 
among those who receive an initial share of the $2. 
A. Experimental Design 
  The sessions were conducted at UC Berkeley. The procedures were very similar to the 
ones in Experiment 1, but added a first stage. The ultimate recipients were told to divide $2 with 
a randomly-paired participant in the other room, by circling one of two choices: keep $2 and give 
the paired participant $0; or keep $1 and send $1 to the other participant.
27 After these partici-
pants made their choices, participants in the other room were told about the first stage and how 
much of the $2 their paired participant shared. The second group of participants could then play 
a $10 dictator game with the same matched participant. The instructions were identical to those 
in Experiment 1 other than emphasizing that the $10 dictator game (including the decision to sort 
in case of the sorting treatment) was the last decision that anybody in either room would make in 
this experiment. 
  In the baseline treatment, the second group was required to play the $10 dictator game. In 
the sorting treatment, second-stage dictators could opt out, in which case they received $10 and 
the partner would not find out about the possibility of the second-stage $10 dictator game. 
B. Results 
The data consists of 192 pairs (54 without and 138 with sorting). In 89 cases (46 percent), 
the first mover shared the two dollars (26 cases [48 percent] without and 63 cases [46 percent] 
with sorting). Figure 2 presents the average amounts shared, both with and without sorting. Sub-
jects who opt out and, hence, share nothing, are included as sharing $0. The first set of bars pre-
sents the mean amounts shared in the (single) dictator games from the Berkeley sessions of Ex-
periment 1. The middle set of bars shows the mean amounts shared in the second stage of the 
double-dictator game when the first-mover shared $1, and the right set of bars presents the mean 
amounts shared when the first-mover shared $0. 
Before we turn to the main results on the effect of sorting, we briefly discuss the evidence 
on reciprocity in the treatments without sorting. The average amount shared by dictators who 
received $1 from the first mover is $2.39, while dictators who received nothing share on average 
$0.70. For comparison, the amount shared by dictators in Experiment 1 is $2.00. Table 3, Col-
                                                 
27 The restriction to passing either $0 or $1 provides more power in the analysis of (ultimate) dictator behavior by 
reducing the analysis to two subgroups.   16
umn 1, shows that only the negative-reciprocity effect is significant: The significantly negative 
coefficient on Reciprocity indicates that, in sessions without sorting, dictators share 13% less if 
they received $0 than in a standard dictator game. Relative to this reduction, receiving $1 leads 
to significantly higher giving, by 17%. However, the difference between baseline sharing ($2) 
and sharing after receiving $1 ($2.39) is not significant (t-statistic = 0.84; p-value = 0.40). In 
other words, there is a significant negative-reciprocity effect and an insignificant positive-
reciprocity effect, which is consistent with previous experimental evidence (e.g., weak positive 
reciprocity but strong “concern withdrawal” in Charness and Rabin, 2002).
28  
Our main question, however, is: Does reciprocity lead to differential sorting effects? 
Looking back at Figure 2, we see that the sorting opportunity significantly decreases the amounts 
shared in all cases, even under positive reciprocity. The average amount shared decreases from 
$2.00 to $1.11 (44 percent) in the single dictator game; from $2.39 to $1.71 (29 percent) when 
$1 was received in the double-dictator game; and from $0.70 to $0.31 (56 percent) when $0 was 
received in the double-dictator game. As Columns 2 to 5 in Table 3 reveal, the significant de-
crease due to sorting does not differ significantly by Reciprocity Treatment or by Amount Re-
ceived, neither under an OLS nor under a tobit specification. (A test of the restriction that the 
two interaction terms are equal to zero fails to reach statistical significance, F(2, 307) = 0.50.) 
The same picture emerges if we consider the frequency of sharing, i.e., the fraction of subjects 
who share any positive amount. The probit regression in the final column of Table 3 shows that 
26 percent of sharers opt out if possible but the interactions of Sorting with Reciprocity and with 
Amount Received are statistically insignificant. Thus, the statistical effect of sorting on sharing 
amounts and frequency appears very similar whether or not sharing is motivated by reciprocity. 
Table 4 provides more insights into the sample composition of self-selected social-
preference types. The upper half reports the sharing proportions in the single dictator games (No 
Reciprocity) and the double-dictator games (Reciprocity treatments), differentiating by amount 
received in the Reciprocity treatments. The bottom half of Table 4 presents the corresponding 
                                                 
28 The analysis based on $10 assumes “narrow bracketing” in the second-stage dictator game. An alternative meas-
ure of reciprocity adds the (possibly shared) amount of $2 back to the analysis (see Cox, 2004): after sharing $1, 
recipients end up with $1+$2.39 = $3.39 out of $12 (28.3%) on average, and after sharing zero, with $2 + $0.70 = 
$2.70 (22.5%) on average, compared to $2 out of $10 (20%) in the single dictator game. Under this measure, posi-
tive reciprocity induces a marginally significant increase in giving (t-statistic = 1.88, p-value = 0.06), and negative 
reciprocity does not have a significant effect. Note that the lack of a significant negative-reciprocity effect reflects 
censoring at $2: Dictators cannot reduce the amount obtained by recipients below $2 if those kept the initial $2. The 
subsequent analysis on the effects of sorting is unchanged when $12 is used as the relevant endowment.   17
estimated proportions of different social preference types. While the fraction of reluctant sharers 
is quite similar in treatments without reciprocity and with inducement of positive reciprocity, the 
proportion of willing sharers varies substantially. The increase in willing sharers, to 65.1 percent 
in the second column, attests to the strength of positive reciprocity. The proportion of non-
sharers varies in a similarly intuitive manner – it is lowest (11.5 percent) when the first mover 
did something kind and highest (67.9 percent) when the first mover did something unkind. In the 
last row, we added a fourth type, which we dubbed “spiteful non-sharers” and whose presence 
attests to the strength of negative reciprocity. These subjects choose to enter the sharing envi-
ronment but share nothing, thus revealing to the recipient that the game was played but nothing 
was shared. The proportion of spiteful non-sharers is much higher when the first mover shared 
nothing with the (ultimate) dictator (20 percent) than when the first mover shared $1 (3.2 per-
cent) or did not have the option to share (6.6 percent). Using a non-parametric chi-square test, 
the negative-reciprocity case is significantly different from both the no-reciprocity and the posi-
tive-reciprocity cases (χ
2(1) = 5.92, p = 0.02 and χ
2(1) = 8.97, p < 0.01 respectively). That is, 
when the first mover shared nothing, second movers are not just less likely to share, but also sig-
nificantly more likely to want to let the first mover know they could have shared. 
Although positive reciprocity leads to a persistent increase in the portion of willing shar-
ers and negative reciprocity to a persistent increase in the portion of non-sharers, the power of 
sorting in altering the self-selected sample composition of social-preference types remains strong 
in all scenarios. 
V. Experiment 3: Subsidized Sharing 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we explored the basic effect of sorting for different social-
preference types and motives. We next introduce price effects to test whether relative prices of 
the environment with and without sorting can be exploited to affect the differential sorting of in-
dividuals with different social preferences. Specifically, in order to test Predictions 2 and 3, we 
introduce subsidies (w > w’) and costs (w < w’) for entry into the sharing environment and ana-
lyze how the different social-preference types respond.  
In Experiment 3, entry into the sharing environment becomes financially attractive (w > 
w’). Here, the main focus is on the reluctant sharers. Since willing sharers enter (and share) 
whenever w ≥ w’, a subsidy should not change their entry decisions. Non-sharers are indifferent 
between not entering and entering (and sharing zero) when w = w’, but should enter and share   18
nothing whenever w > w’. Reluctant sharers, instead, view entering and sharing as costly, and 
should therefore enter depending on the size of the subsidy. If their disutility from entry is pro-
portional to some positive function of the amount they share initially (relative sharing aversion), 
low subsidies will primarily attract those reluctant sharers who share the least. As a result, small 
subsidies may decrease the average amount shared by entrants. 
In order to pin down each subject’s type and generosity in sharing, we use a within-
subject design: Each subject first plays the standard dictator game for $10 both without and with 
a sorting option, but no price differential (w = w’). The behavior observed in the two games de-
termines each individual’s type. This part of the experiment is a within-subject replication of the 
two treatments of Experiment 1. Then, subjects play the sorting treatment with increasing subsi-
dies for entry into the dictator game. The amount available in the dictator game goes up while the 
amount available after opting out remains $10 (w > w’). The observed response to the increasing 
subsidies reveals how the sorting behavior of the different types interacts with prices. 
The within-subject design also provides a measure of the generosity of different types. 
The between-subject treatment made it difficult to assess whether those who share willingly are 
more generous than those who share reluctantly since we could not track individuals across envi-
ronments with and without sorting. Experiment 3 allows us to examine the amounts shared by all 
types in both the rounds without and with sorting. 
In addition, by adding a No-Anonymity treatment, we also explores the robustness of our 
findings to situations in which dictators are not anonymous but have to face the recipient – as in 
the many cases in which real-world dictators are directly confronted by someone requesting aid 
or donations.  
A. Experimental Design 
Experiment 3 took place at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economic Laboratory (PEEL). 
Subjects were graduate and undergraduate students at the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie 
Mellon University. We conducted 12 sessions, 6 in each anonymity treatment. A total of 188 
subjects participated, 92 (46 dictators) in the No-Anonymity treatment and 96 (48 dictators) in 
the Anonymity treatment.
29 Dictators were informed that they would make a series of decisions, 
with new instructions distributed prior to each decision. Payoffs would be based on one decision 
                                                 
29 One subject was accidentally allowed to participate twice (both times as dictator). We omitted this subject’s sec-
ond participation from the data. Since subjects’ choices were never revealed to anyone else until the end of the ex-
periment, it is very unlikely that this subject influenced the choices of other dictators in the second session.   19
randomly selected at the end of the experiment. In each decision, the procedure replicated that of 
Experiment 1, other than the changing dictator game endowment.
30 
Decision 1. Decision 1 consisted of a dictator game with no sorting. The endowment was 
$10, denoted as 40 tokens. Subjects were told that if Decision 1 were selected to count at the end 
of the experiment, then the experimenter would describe the dictator game publicly to the other 
participants and each recipient would find out how much money he or she had been given. In the 
No-Anonymity treatment the dictators themselves handed the sheets to the recipients. 
Decision 2. In Decision 2, dictators had the opportunity to play the same dictator game as 
in Decision 1, with a (potentially) new randomly selected participant. Alternatively, they could 
choose to “pass” (i.e., not to play the game). The procedure mirrored the Sorting treatment in 
Experiment 1. Dictators had to open one of two envelopes. If they opened the envelope labeled 
“Play,” they would see the number of their matched participant, write down their own number, 
and indicate a division of 40 tokens. If they opened the envelope labeled “Pass,” they would not 
see a participant number, but would write down their own number and mark an “X” on the sheet 
inside. Subjects were told that if they chose to play the game and if Decision 2 were selected to 
count, then their paired recipient would be informed about the game and the allocation of tokens. 
Remaining Decisions. The remaining three decisions (four in the No-Anonymity case) 
proceeded exactly as Decision 2, with the exception that the dictator-game endowment increased. 
Table 5 presents the endowment for each decision.
31  
At the end of each session, the experimenter randomly drew one of the decisions to 
count. Then either all recipients (if Decision 1 was drawn) or only those matched to dictators 
who decided to play (if Decision 2 or higher was drawn) were informed about the game and 
shown the payoff sheet filled out by their matched dictator. In the No-Anonymity treatment, the 
dictators themselves handed the sheets to the recipients. They were then paid their earnings and 
participation fee. Unmatched participants were not informed and were paid $6. 
Note that we did not counter-balance the order of the decisions across sessions. The pur-
pose of the within-subject design was to compare the rates of re-entry, under increasing subsi-
                                                 
30 Recipients were slightly worse off relative to Experiment 1: they had to fill in a series of questionnaires rather 
than one brief questionnaire, due to the fact that Experiment 3 consisted of several decisions and thus took longer. 
31 The number of decisions and endowments differ between Anonymity and No-Anonymity treatments since an ini-
tial pilot session revealed that, under Anonymity, almost all subjects play the dictator game once the endowment 
reaches about $13. Since our goal was to explain differences in “re-entry” to the game, we fine-tuned the payoffs to 
measure such differences. We also decreased the number of rounds to allow the experiment to run more quickly.   20
dies, within the group of reluctant sharers. In order to be comparable, all subjects had to be ex-
posed to the exact same initial treatment. Among different possible “initial treatments,” the 
above order (starting with the standard dictator game) permits comparisons of the first decision 
to standard dictator games. However, other “initial treatments” might also be of interest, and the 




The behavior in Decisions 1 and 2 strongly corroborates the findings of the between-
subjects design in Experiment 1. When dictators are forced to play the game (Decision 1), 74 
percent share. When subjects are given the opportunity to opt out of the game (Decision 2), only 
30 percent share. As a result, the average amount shared per subject decreases substantially, from 
$2.68 without sorting (Decision 1) to $1.19 when sorting becomes possible (Decision 2). 
The impact of sorting is robust to the removal of anonymity. In the standard dictator 
game (Decision 1), 81 percent share in the No-Anonymity treatment and 67 percent in the Ano-
nymity treatment. As shown in Table 5, subjects share average amounts of $2.42 (Anonymity) 
and $2.92 (No Anonymity). Thus, as expected, the lack of anonymity produces slightly more 
sharing, but this difference is not statistically significant (t92 = 1.17). In the dictator game with 
sorting (Decision 2), only 25 percent share in the No-Anonymity treatment and 35 percent in the 
Anonymity treatment. The average amounts shared decrease, to $1.22 in Anonymity and to 
$1.17 in No-Anonymity. Thus, the lack of anonymity makes opting out more attractive and re-
duces sharing slightly more, but the difference in amounts is again not significant (t92 = 0.14).
33  
The results of the first two decisions in Experiment 3 demonstrate the robustness of the 
                                                 
32 Note, however, that variation in the order of Decisions 1 and 2 turned out to be redundant since the outcomes 
closely replicate the results from the between-subjects experiments. Also note that we do not account, separately, for 
learning since several recent studies of repeated dictator games have found little change in behavior over time (Duf-
fy and Kornienko, 2005; Hamman et al., 2009), differently from, for example, the case of dominance-solvable 
games (Rick and Weber, 2010). In Appendix 2 we demonstrate that our findings hold in an alternate dataset (Bro-
berg, et al, 2007), in which subjects first played a dictator game (Decision 1) and then stated a reservation price for 
exiting the game (the remaining decisions collapsed into one). Unlike in our data, where we directly observe re-entry 
into the sharing environment, re-entry in this other experiment is implicit in the reservation price. More generally, 
since their experimental data was collected using different procedures (but never previously analyzed in light of our 
Predictions 2 and 3), the confirmation of our results highlights that the strong compositional effects of sorting and 
prices are not unique to our experimental procedures. 
33 Behavior in Decisions 3 and beyond does not differ between anonymity treatments either, when controlling for 
endowments. For example, comparing Decision 3 under No-Anonymity and Decision 4 under Anonymity, both with 
an endowment of $11, neither the average amounts shared ($1.51 and $1.42) are significantly different (t92 = 0.20) 
nor the frequencies of entry (z = 1.59).   21
sorting effect, both when we relax anonymity and when we conduct a within-subject test.  
Classification of Social-Preference Types 
The within-subject design of Experiment 3 allows classification of individual subjects in-
to the three posited types. Based on their first two decisions, 23 percent of the subjects are non-
sharers—they share nothing in Decision 1 and either opt not to play or share nothing in Decision 
2; 29 percent are willing sharers, who share both in Decision 1 and in Decision 2. The largest 
group, 41 percent, consists of reluctant sharers; they share in Decision 1 and opt out in Decision 
2. These three categories account for 95 percent of the subjects.
34 Compared to Experiment 1, the 
proportions differ slightly: here, we have fewer non-sharers and more reluctant sharers. The dis-
tributions of types do not differ significantly by anonymity (χ
2(2) = 3.49, p = 0.18).
35  
Given the above classification, we can determine which type – willing sharers or reluc-
tant sharers – behaves most generously in the dictator game. Recall that the average amount 
shared conditional on entry in Experiment 1 was slightly higher under sorting, but the between-
subject design did not allow calculation of the unconditional sharing of both types . Experiment 3 
reveals that the average amount shared (in Decision 1 without sorting) is $4.46 for willing shar-
ers ($4.22 under Anonymity and $4.77 under No Anonymity) and $3.10 for reluctant sharers 
($3.20 under Anonymity and $3.04 under No Anonymity). The difference is significant at the p < 
0.001 level (t64 = 3.95). Thus, those who share willingly, i.e., even when they can avoid the shar-
ing environment, are on average significantly more generous than those who share reluctantly, a 
finding confirmed in a door-to-door fundraising field experiment in DellaVigna et al. (2010). 
Compositional Effect: Who Do Subsidies Attract into the Sharing Environment? 
The principal issue addressed by Experiment 3 is how subsidizing entry into the sharing 
environment influences the sorting of different types. Willing sharers, by definition, enter the 
sharing environment when there is no subsidy (w = w’) and should continue to enter if there is a 
subsidy (w > w’). In fact, we find that, in Decisions 3 and up, when the sharing environment is 
                                                 
34 Of the remaining five subjects, three shared something in Decision 1 ($0.25, $2.50, $5) and shared nothing in the 
remainder of the experiment (but frequently opted to play). We might classify these three subjects as reluctant shar-
ers, though they did not rely on the sorting opportunity. Another subject shared $2.50 initially, shared $0.50 in Deci-
sion 4, and nothing otherwise (but opted to play every time). A final subject shared nothing initially, but then shared 
$4 in all subsequent decisions – possibly a willing sharer, with trembles or noise in the first decision.  
35 Males are more likely to be non-sharers than women (M: 30%; F: 20%) and less likely to be reluctant sharers (M: 
30%; F: 47%). However, the difference in distributions of types by gender is not statistically significant (χ
2(2) = 
1.97, p = 0.37).   22
subsidized, willing sharers enter the sharing environment 90 percent of the time.
36 Upon enter-
ing, they share significant amounts, at least $3.82 on average for every endowment level. 
Non-sharers, by definition, share nothing in Decision 2 when w = w’, mostly by opting 
out (70 percent). We predicted that those non-sharers who opt out re-enter when the sharing en-
vironment is subsidized. In Decision 3 and beyond, non-sharers enter the sharing environment 78 
percent of the time.
37 As expected, they share very little when they enter, never more than $0.17 
on average for any dictator game endowment. 
Most important is the behavior of reluctant sharers. Table 6 reports the marginal effects 
from probit estimations with subjects’ decisions to play (1) or to pass (0) as the dependent vari-
able. Since all subjects had to play the game in Decision 1 and since the choice to play the game 
in Decision 2 is used to construct the types, we exclude these two decisions from the analysis. 
We control for the endowment in each round. (The results in the table are substantively un-
changed when we also control for treatment, gender and decision.) 
  Column 1 explores the relative entry frequencies of the three different types (We exclude 
the five subjects who did not fit the classification scheme). The omitted category, willing sharers, 
enters at a significantly higher rate than non-sharers (15 percent more often) and than reluctant 
sharers (35 percent more often). The difference between non-sharers and reluctant sharers is sta-
tistically significant (χ
2(1) = 13.89, p < 0.001). As predicted, reluctant sharers are the least will-
ing to re-enter the sharing environment as entry becomes subsidized. 
  Most interestingly, Prediction 2 also stated that a high enough subsidy would lure reluc-
tant sharers back into the game, but that for any given subsidy those most likely to enter would 
be those who share the least. Figures 3A and 3B show the frequencies with which different sub-
groups of reluctant sharers re-enter the sharing environment as the subsidy increases across deci-
sions. We split reluctant sharers into three groups, based on how much they shared in Decision 1. 
Consistent with Prediction 2, those who re-enter first are those who shared the least in Decision 
1. For example, those who shared only $1.25 or less in Decision 1 all re-enter the game by Deci-
sion 4 in both treatments, while those who shared more require greater subsidies to re-enter. In 
                                                 
36 As the percentage is below 100, our classification is imperfect. Two participants account for most of the excep-
tions. They shared positive amounts in Decisions 1 and 2 (and were thus classified as willing sharers), but opted out 
in every remaining Decision. 
37 Entry among-non sharers increased with the size of the endowment in the game. For example, 61 percent entered 
in Decision 3, but more than 83 percent did so for all subsequent decision. This reluctance to enter at low subsidies 
perhaps indicates that, as we discussed above, some non-sharers experience disutility from sharing nothing in the 
game – not enough to lead them to share, but enough induce opting out and even foregoing a (low) subsidy.   23
fact, for every decision, across both treatments, the highest entry frequency is for those who 
shared the least initially. Thus, for the subgroup of reluctant sharers, generosity in sharing turns 
out to be a negative predictor of subjects’ willingness to enter the sharing environment. 
Columns 2 through 5 of Table 6 test the statistical significance of the relationship be-
tween entry and (initial) generosity in sharing. Column 2 shows that, taking willing sharers and 
reluctant sharers together, there is no relation between initial proportion shared and entry. Con-
trolling for reluctance, however, we see that reluctant sharers enter at lower frequency and that 
there is a significantly negative relationship between entry and initial proportion shared (Column 
3). The negative relationship appears to be driven by reluctant sharers who shared a lot initially 
(Column 4). That is, the lower entry rates of reluctant sharers in Column 3 are driven by gener-
ous reluctant sharers. As Column 5 shows more directly, there is a strong negative relationship 
between amount shared initially and entry into the sharing environment when using only the 
sample of reluctant sharers. The coefficient on Initial Proportion Shared indicates that for every 
additional percentage unit of the endowment shared in Decision 1, reluctant sharers are 0.82 per-
cent less likely to enter the sharing environment. Thus a reluctant sharer who initially shared $5 
is roughly 33 percent (i.e., 0.82 · 40 percentage units) less likely to enter than one who shared $1. 
Overall, we find strong support for Prediction 2: Subsidized entry by reluctant sharers is 
inversely proportional to the amount they share if the sharing environment is unavoidable. 
How Large Are The Compositional Effects? 
We have found that a subsidized sharing environment foremost attracts those least willing 
to share – non-sharers and the least generous reluctant sharers. The economic magnitude of the 
differential sorting effect is large. For example, in Decision 2, when sorting was costless, the av-
erage amount shared by those who entered the sharing environment was $2.88 ($2.68 with ano-
nymity and $3.11 without), a small increase relative to the $2.68 ($2.42 with anonymity and 
$2.92 without) in Decision 1, when everyone was required to enter, which is similar to what we 
observed for Experiment 1. But when there was a $1 subsidy for entering (Decision 4 with ano-
nymity and Decision 3 without), the average amount shared by those who entered decreased to 
$2.22 ($1.92 with anonymity and $2.59 without). In fact, for every subsidy level below $6 (i.e., 
for all decisions with endowments below $16), the average amount shared conditional on entry is 
lower than when there is no subsidy.  
A possible concern about the large raw effect of sorting under subsidies, however, is that   24
it may reflect influences other than differential sorting by different social-preference types, such 
as the increasing endowment or round effects. In order to distinguish these and other unspecified 
confounds from the compositional effect of differential sorting, we estimate the effect of mere 
sorting under two hypothetical sharing rules that impose some consistency on sharing behavior. 
One hypothetical sharing rule is that individuals always share the same proportion of the en-
dowment as they did in Decision 1 if they decide to enter. This assumption amounts to individu-
als proportionally sharing the subsidy. An alternative hypothetical sharing rule is that individuals 
always share the same absolute amount as in Decision 1, conditional on entry. This assumption 
amounts to individuals fully pocketing the subsidy. These two hypothetical sharing rules provide 
upper and lower bounds on how much individuals would share if they were to neither pocket nor 
share more than the full amount of the subsidy, which accurately describes 74 percent of the ac-
tual choices made by those entering the sharing environment. 
Table 7 estimates the magnitude of the compositional sorting effect under these two hy-
pothetical sharing rules. For comparison, we show the estimations using the actual amount 
shared as the dependent variable in Columns 1 (OLS) and 2 (tobit). We then show the estima-
tions using the predicted amount shared if individuals stick to the same proportion of the en-
dowment as in Decision 1 (Columns 3 and 4) or to the same absolute amount as in Decision 1 
(Column 5 and 6). (We use amounts rather than proportions as dependent variables to more 
clearly illustrate the monetary consequences of selective sorting.) We regress each of these de-
pendent variables on three explanatory variables: “Sorting Option,” a binary variable equal to 
one in all rounds with a sorting option (Decisions 2-6); “Presence of Subsidy,” a binary variable 
equal to one in all rounds with subsidies (Decisions 3-6); and “Amount of Subsidy ($0.50 to 
$10.00, see Table 5). Standard errors are clustered by subject. 
The positive coefficient estimate of Sorting Option under the two hypothetical sharing 
rules indicates that those who always enter the sharing environment (willing sharers) share more 
on average than those who opt out when it is costless to do so (reluctant sharers). The coefficient 
of Presence of Subsidy is significantly negative and similar in magnitude under all three sharing 
rules, both in the OLS estimations and the tobit estimations. The OLS estimates indicate that the 
presence of a subsidy decreases conditional amounts shared by about $0.90, controlling for the 
amount of the subsidy. However, each dollar of subsidy increases sharing amounts, by between 
$0.05 and $0.35 for the predicted amount shared. Hence, a small subsidy (e.g., $1 or $2) results   25
in lower average amounts shared in the dictator game. While the net negative effect in the first 
model (actual amount shared) could be influenced by people changing how much they share 
conditional on entry, Models 2 and 3 show that endogenous sorting alone has the same effect. 
Experiment 3 provides strong support for Prediction 2. Subsidizing the sharing environ-
ment creates entry, but foremost by those who share the least. As a result, the composition of the 
sharing environment, for low subsidies, yields lower sharing on average than under no subsidy.  
VI. Experiment 4: Costly Sharing  
Our experiments illustrate that, allowing for price variation, endogenous sorting can lead 
to drastically different sample compositions of social-preference types. So far, all results imply a 
negative effect of sorting on sharing. In every comparison, the aggregate amount shared has been 
lower when sorting was possible. In Experiment 3, we showed that subsidizing entry into the 
sharing environment has the additional effect of foremost attracting those who share the least, 
thus often leading to lower sharing on average.  
However, comparing the amounts shared conditional on entry into the dictator game, we 
found slightly greater average amounts shared among those who enter if sorting is costless than 
in the baseline, across both Experiments 1 and 3 and all three locations. While none of the differ-
ences is statistically significant, the regularity suggests that sorting, if properly designed, may 
allow attracting those who share most: If a subsidized sharing environment attracts more but less 
generous types, does costly entry into the sharing environment attract fewer but more generous 
types? This would be attractive if a sharing environment has limited capacity for entry and, 
hence, the conditional sharing behavior of those few who enter is the relevant sharing outcome. 
For example, while some organizations rely on paid individuals for canvassing, political cam-
paigns do not actively recruit people; volunteers tend to be underpaid – and very dedicated. 
Could the financial disincentive be more than a reflection of financial constraints – namely, an 
attempt to attract the most generous “sharers”? 
In Experiment 4, we explore whether it is possible to induce self-selection of high sharers 
by reversing the paradigm of Experiment 3. Instead of subsidizing entry into the sharing envi-
ronment, we introduce a $1 cost for entering the $10 dictator game. That is, subjects could 
choose to play the dictator game with an endowment of w = $10, or not to play the game, in 
which case they received a payment of w’ = $11 and the recipient remained uninformed about 
the game. As stated in Prediction 3, we expect to see low aggregate sharing, as the entry cost   26
should prevent non-sharers and reluctant sharers from entering, as well as some willing sharers 
who do not receive high utility from sharing. But, by attracting only those willing sharers who 
place the highest value on acting generously, we should also observe high conditional sharing.  
A. Experimental Design 
We conducted a treatment with a $1 entry cost both in Berkeley and in Pittsburgh. The 
procedures and instructions closely followed Experiment 1. The only major difference was that 
subjects received w’ = $11 (instead of $10) if not playing the dictator game. Subjects were re-
cruited in the same manner and from the same populations as for Experiments 1 (Berkeley) and 3 
(Pittsburgh). Upon arriving at the experiment, all subjects were told they would receive a partici-
pation fee ($7 in Pittsburgh, $5 in Berkeley), and were randomly assigned ID numbers. Half of 
the participants were taken to another room, where they completed questionnaires. The remain-
ing participants received instructions very similar to those from Experiment 1, except for the $11 
outside option. Entry decisions were again made by opening one of two envelopes. Recipients in 
the other room were only brought into the room and informed of the dictator game if the dictator 
with whom they were paired had opted to play the game. 
B. Results 
We collected data from 54 pairs of participants across the Berkeley and Pittsburgh loca-
tions.
38 Figure 4 presents, in the second set of bars, the average amount shared per subject in the 
new costly entry (p = $1) treatment and the average amount shared conditional on entry into the 
dictator game. For comparison purposes, we also include the average amounts shared from Ex-
periments 1 and 3 in the Berkeley and Pittsburgh baseline no-sorting dictator games on the left.  
As expected, very few subjects choose to enter the sharing environment when there is a 
$1 price for doing so. Of the 54 potential dictators, only 12 (22 percent) choose to play the 
game.
39 As a result of the very limited entry, aggregate sharing is low, 0.78 on average, and 
mean overall sharing is low relative to the baseline dictator game ($2.21 vs. $0.78, significantly 
different in a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test, z = 4.742, p < 0.001). 
                                                 
38 In one early session, a subject chose to enter and shared zero. When the experimenter later asked this subject why, 
the subject responded that he thought he would not get the $5 participation payment otherwise, meaning that the 
subject perceived the choice between entering (and receiving $5 plus $10 to share) and not entering and receiving 
only $11. In subsequent sessions, we asked every subject to provide reasons for their choices after the experiment, 
and excluded subjects clearly misunderstanding the instructions. This excluded a total of four participants from the 
analysis, including one who opted out of the sharing environment and two who shared positive amounts.  
39 Women enter more frequently than men (28 percent vs. 15 percent); this difference is not statistically significant.   27
However, conditional on entering the sharing environment, participants share signifi-
cantly more than in the baseline dictator game ($3.50 vs. $2.21, z = 2.12, p = 0.03). Thus, as 
stated in Prediction 3, introducing a positive price for entering the dictator game attracts fewer 
people, but those who enter share more than the average person in the typical baseline dictator 
game. Of course, aggregate sharing is considerably lower when there is a price to entering the 
sharing environment, but those who enter share significantly more than the population as a 
whole. This suggests that in environments with limited capacity for entry and in which it is 
costly to enter, we might observe more pro-social behavior than one would find by sampling at 
random from the entire population.
40 
VII. Conclusion 
People regularly sort into and out of economic environments such as firms, markets, and 
institutions. Their sorting decisions are based on relative prices and governed by their personal 
preferences. Due to the endogenous selection, market outcomes can look very different from 
those we would expect if the entire population participated in a market. While a large literature 
in economics analyzes endogenous selection theoretically and empirically, there has been less 
emphasis on its role in the context of social preferences. Much of the literature on social prefer-
ences builds on laboratory findings. But in the laboratory, subjects are typically placed in one 
particular situation and forced to make a choice that they might avoid making outside the labora-
tory. The goal of our analysis is to model the influence of sorting in the context of social prefer-
ences and to investigate how it affects conclusions drawn from laboratory environments without 
sorting. Our paper is novel in focusing on how prices and social preferences interact with sorting 
opportunities to yield observed samples in environments that allow sharing that differ considera-
bly from the population as a whole. 
We introduce the possibility of sorting, along with varying prices for sorting, into the dic-
tator game, a common laboratory measure of sharing and altruism. Our key novel finding is that 
the impact of sorting reflects the differential sorting of subjects with different social preferences, 
and that the relationship between the amount an individual is willing to share and that individ-
ual’s willingness to enter the sharing environment is not always linear. Our work provides an ex-
                                                 
40 One possible concern with this finding is that the high conditional sharing rests on the behavior of a small sample 
of participants. i.e., the 12 subjects who chose to pay $1 for the opportunity to share. This is the result of the low 
entry rates (in one 10-person session, all subjects opted out). However, confidence in our results is strengthened by 
our novel reanalysis, in Appendix 2, of Broberg et al.’s (2007) data, which yields very similar results.   28
ample of how the laboratory can be used to systematically study the responsiveness of different 
types to varying sorting options.  
Our results have immediate implications for a variety of real-world sharing situations, in 
which individuals can decide whether or not to place themselves in situations where sharing is 
possible or to avoid sharing requests altogether. Such contexts include charitable giving, blood 
donation, and responses to survey requests. Our findings illustrate that giving behavior can vary 
vastly depending on sorting opportunities, e.g., in a door-to-door fundraiser versus canvassing on 
the street, since the population reached features different social preferences. But our results can 
also apply to the choices individuals make when selecting careers or where to live – those who 
choose jobs or cities in which they receive a lot of requests for aid are potentially different from 
the population as a whole. Moreover, our results demonstrate the importance of relative prices; 
for example, a low-paying job that allows many opportunities to help others is likely to attract 
those who are most pro-social. Finally, going even beyond contexts to which the dictator game 
example may directly generalize, our findings raise the broader question about other important 
contexts in which sorting according to social preferences may take place. For example, if pro-
social preferences induce individuals to avoid competitive environments, as indicated in Bartling 
et al. (2009), then we might see weaker social preferences at the top levels of companies.  
We also present several novel laboratory results. First, we demonstrate that the effect of 
sorting is robust, both in its economic magnitude and statistical strength, to “strengthening” the 
motivation for sharing. Even when we induce positive reciprocity among our dictators, sorting 
diminishes the extent to which individuals repay the first-movers kindness. Second, we demon-
strate that prices strongly affect sorting decisions. The price effects interact with different types 
of social preferences to dramatically alter the composition of the sorting environment. Subsidiz-
ing entry into the sharing environment attracts people who share little, relative to when there is 
no subsidy, thereby leading to lower (conditional) average amounts shared in the sharing envi-
ronment. Conversely, making entry into a sharing environment costly attracts people who share 
more than the population average, leading to a greater (conditional) average amount shared in the 
environment than is representative of the population. While previous research by Broberg, et al. 
(2007), explored the relationship between prices and sorting decisions, their paper stops short of 
considering the compositional effects of costs and subsidies, as we do here (see Appendix 2).    29
Finally, an important caveat merits repeating. While we find that subsidized entry de-
creases average conditional sharing, the total aggregate amounts shared increases; and the oppo-
site holds if entry is costly. But, in the many situations where a sharing environment has limited 
capacity for entry (e.g., in the case of limited hiring), average conditional sharing might be the 
relevant measure. For example, many organizations have a limited number of positions for vol-
unteers, who tend to be unpaid or underpaid but very dedicated. Another reason why aggregate 
giving is not the sole variable of interest is that it has little to say about aggregate welfare. Policy 
makers may want to limit fundraising strategies that rely on extracting donations from reluctant 
givers rather than willing givers. Hence, the key variable of interest for the fundraising organiza-
tion is how much giving can be raised per person conditional on not sorting out.   30
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Barcelona   -0.013 
(0.045)    -0.024 
(0.074)    -0.041 
(0.112) 
Sorting X Barcelona    -0.050 
(0.058)    -0.145 
(0.124)    -0.139 
(0.154) 
Observations  168  168 168 168  168 168 
(pseudo) R
2  0.070  0.084 0.086 0.107  0.070 0.082 
 
Notes: Sorting is a dummy equal to one in treatments where subjects can opt out. The dependent 
variable Proportion Shared is zero for subjects who opted out. The dependent variable Shared 
Something is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject shared a positive amount. The tobit model accounts 
for 89 observations being left-censored at zero. The probit model shows marginal effects. Robust 
standard are in parentheses (with bias-correction (HC3) in the linear case, see MacKinnon and 
White (1985)) and are calculated using jackknife estimation for the tobit model. Constant included. 
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   35
(1) (2) (3)




Gender: Female -0.010 -0.013
(0.033) (0.032) 0.03
Ethnicity: Catalan 0.0285 0.042
(0.045) (0.044) 0.08
Ethnicity: Asian 0.016 0.001
(0.058) (0.057) 0.00
Ethnicity: White -0.075 -0.074
(0.057) (0.054) 0.10
Socio-economic status: middle class -0.005 0.006
(0.039) (0.038) 0.01
upper to middle class -0.006 -0.005
(0.043) (0.043) 0.01
Age group: Graduate Student -0.010 -0.012
(0.053) (0.053) 0.02
Major: Business or Economics -0.040 -0.036
(0.037) (0.037) 0.09
University: Berkeley 0.011 0.021
(0.067) (0.063) 0.03
University: Pompeu Fabra -0.065 -0.073
(0.050) (0.049) 0.13
Siblings: 0 siblings 0.054 0.037
(0.067) (0.071) 0.05
            1 sibling -0.078** -0.083**
(0.037) (0.035) 0.19
3 or more siblings -0.047 -0.058
(0.057) (0.055) 0.10




Constant 0.194*** 0.214*** 0.264***
(0.022) (0.076) (0.070)
Observations 168 166 166
(Adjusted) R-Square 0.07 0.03 0.10
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: OLS regressions with Percentage Shared (out of $10.00 or €10.00 endowment) as the dependent
variable. Bias-corrected robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses.
Table 2. Determinants of Sharing (Experiment 1)
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Table 3. Effect of Sorting on Sharing with Reciprocity 
(Experiments 1 and 2, Berkeley data) 
 
 
       
Model: OLS  Tobit  Probit 







 (No Sorting)  All Data 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















































Sorting X  
Reciprocity Treatment     0.050 




Sorting X  
Amount Received     -0.029 




















Observations  99  313 313 313 313 313 
(pseudo) R
2  0.113  0.136 0.138 0.189 0.191 0.139 
 
Notes: Reprocity Treatment is an indicator for double-dictator games. Amount Received is the amount shared 
in the first-stage (small) dicator game ($0 or $1). Sorting is a dummy equal to one in treatments where sub-
jects can opt out. The dependent variable Proportion Shared is zero for subjects who opted out. The dependent 
variable Shared Something is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject shared a positive amount. The tobit model 
accounts for 89 observations being left-censored at zero. The probit model shows marginal effects. Robust 
standard are in parentheses (with bias-correction (HC3) in the linear case, see MacKinnon and White (1985)) 
and are calculated using jackknife estimation for the tobit model.  
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   37
Table 4. Distribution of Sharing Types without and with Reciprocity 
(Experiments 1 and 2, Berkeley data) 
 
 








a. Proportion sharing something in 























      
Estimated frequencies of types:      
Willing sharers (b)  38.2%  65.1%  21.3% 
Reluctant sharers (a-b) 26.3%  23.4%  10.8% 
Non-sharers (100-a)  35.6%  11.5%  67.9% 
“Spiteful non-sharers” (100-b-c)  6.6% 3.2%  20.0% 
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No  $10.00 
(40 tokens)  1  $2.42 
(24.2%)  100% 1 $2.92 
(29.2%)  100% 
Yes  $10.00 
(40 tokens)  2  $1.22 
(12.2%)  46% 2  $1.17 
(11.7%)  38% 
Yes  $10.50 
(42 tokens)  3  $1.34 
(12.8%)  57%      
Yes  $11.00 
(44 tokens)  4  $1.42 
(12.9%)  74% 3  $1.51 
(13.7%)  58% 
Yes  $12.00 
(48 tokens)  5  $1.52 
(12.7%)  76%      
Yes  $13.00 
(52 tokens)      4  $2.07 
(15.9%)  73% 
Yes  $16.00 
(64 tokens)      5  $3.21 
(20%)  90% 
Yes  $20.00 
(80 tokens)      6  $4.53 
(22.7%)  100% 
Number of sessions  6  6 







 Notes: All averages are unconditional, i.e., subjects opted out are included (as sharing $0).   39
 
Table 6. Determinants of Entry into Sharing Environment 
(Experiment 3, excluding Decisions 1 and 2) 
 
 
Sample:  All Classified Subj. Willing and Reluctant Sharers   Reluctant 
Sharers  
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Initial Proportion 












(0.077)       
Reluctant Sharers  -0.346
*** 




(0.196)   
Initial Prop. Shared 
X Reluctant Sharers       -0.882
* 
(0.460)   

















Observations 312  234  234  234  141 
Pseudo-R
2 0.228  0.113  0.270  0.279  0.223 
 
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit estimations. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 
one if the subject shared any positive amount. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   40
Table 7. Effects of Sorting and Subsidies on Conditional Sharing:  












 OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit OLS Tobit 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Sorting Option 

















Presence of Subsidy 





















































Observations  382  382 382 382  382  382 
(pseudo) R
2  0.072  0.011 0.143 0.024  0.015 0.003 
 
Notes: Robust standard (errors clustered by subject) are in parentheses. The tobit model accounts for 114 obser-
vations being left-censored at zero in column (2) and 96 observations in columns (4) and (6). 
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1A. Distributions of Amounts Shared 














































Figure 1B. Distributions of Amounts Shared 
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Figure 1C. Distribution of Difference in Amounts Shared 



















































Difference in Percentage under Sorting
Notes: Coefficient estimates of the Sorting indicator and confidence intervals are from linear regressions of 
indicators for giving bins on the treatment dummy (Sorting) and full set of socio-demographic control variables 
(see Table 2.) Confidence intervals use bias-corrected robust standard errors (HC3). 
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Figure 2. Average Amounts Shared without and with Reciprocity 
(Experiment 2; No-Reciprocity data from Experiment 1 Berkeley sessions) 
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Figure 3A. Proportion of Reluctant Sharers Choosing to Enter 




Figure 3B. Proportion of Reluctant Sharers Choosing to Enter 
by Decision and Initial Amount Shared (No Anonymity) 
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Figure 4. Average Proportions of Endowment Shared: Costly Entry 
(Includes Berkeley and Pittsburgh Baseline Data from Experiments 1 and 3) 
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Appendix Figure 1. Sharing by Subsample (Experiment 1)
Sharing by subsamples based on demographics and elicited preferences. The number in parentheses next to
each subgroup indicates the number of dictators. The left bar in each subgroup indicates the average
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Appendix 1: Cobb-Douglas Specification of Social Preferences 
Appendix 1 provides more details of the theoretical framework and provides one concrete ex-
ample of a utility function for which relative sharing aversion holds, a modified Cobb-
Douglas utility function.  
As in the main text, consider an agent who is endowed with an amount w, which she has to 
divide into payoffs for herself (x) and for another agent (y), as in the classic dictator game: 
(1)  x + y = w. 
We allow utility to depend on the payoffs x and y as well as on the sharing environment: 
(2)  U = U(D, x, y)  
where D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the environment allows sharing and 0 if the alloca-
tion of w is exogenously determined. That is, under D = 1 the agent decides how to split w 
with the other person. Under D = 0 the agent has no influence on how w is allocated. When 
D = 0, the individual is precluded from sharing and thus y = 0. It is possible that even with the 
opportunity to share (i.e. when D = 1), y = 0, but this depends on individual choice. We as-
sume that utility is increasing in the endowment. Using equation (1), the utility function can 
be rewritten as U = U(D, x, w – x). 
We characterize an individual’s propensity to share in the sharing environment with 
the parameter a. The agent allocates y = aw to the other person and x = (1-a)w to herself. In-
dividuals who choose a = 0 are denoted as non-sharers. Individuals with a > 0 are either will-
ing sharers or reluctant sharers. Willing sharers would pay to be in the sharing environment. 
Reluctant sharers would pay to avoid the sharing environment. That is, holding the endow-
ment constant, willing sharers prefer the sharing environment and reluctant sharers prefer the 
non-sharing one.  However, both kinds of agents behave identically in the sharing environ-
ment if they have the same sharing propensity a. 
Now, suppose that the endowments in the two environments differ. In the sharing en-
vironment the individual is given w to divide, while in the non-sharing environment she re-
ceives a fixed amount w’, which cannot be shared. We parameterize an individual’s willing-
ness to pay by the endowment in the sharing environment ŵ at which she is indifferent be-
tween entering the sharing environment and opting out, given a fixed endowment w’ outside 
the sharing environment. The higher ŵ is, the larger is the individual’s disutility from being in 
the sharing environment. Willing sharers have ŵ < w’ because they are willing to pay for the 
opportunity to share. Reluctant sharers have ŵ > w’ because they are willing to pay to avoid 
that environment altogether. Non-sharers are not willing to pay to avoid the sharing environ-
ment (ŵ = w’).
41 The premium ŵ – w’ that an individual is willing to pay to avoid the sharing 
environment relative to an outside option of w’ is implicitly defined by 
(3) U(1, x', ŵ – x') = U(0, w’, 0) 
where x' is the own payoff chosen in a sharing environment with allocation ŵ. We define  
                                                 
41 This is a simplifying assumption, not a general statement (but also not required for our analysis). The model 
can be generalized to allow a more subtle distinction of types. For example, agents who share nothing in the 
sharing environment may still pay something to avoid being put in that environment and, hence, have ŵ > w’. 
Other agents may get some utility from sharing but feel compelled to share too much in a sharing environment. 
As a result, such agents avoid the sharing situation (and thus share nothing) despite their preference for sharing. 
These agents have ŵ > w’. Additionally, individuals might be reluctant to share over some ranges of w and will-
ing to share in other ranges. For brevity and simplicity we distinguish only the three basic types, based on their 
observable (“net”) sharing decision.   48
(4)  λ(w’) = ŵ/w’. 
Willing sharers have a λ < 1, and reluctant sharers have a λ > 1. 
Special case: Modified Cobb-Douglas utility function 
We consider a branched Cobb-Douglas utility function which allows for individuals to have 
the opportunity to share (or not). Its value depends on x, y, D, and a parameter λ
a, which we 
describe below, as follows: 
(5)  ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ][ 1 [ ) , , (
) 1 ( )] 1 /( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( a a a a a D D a a a D D D D y x y x D U
− − − + − − − + − + = λ  
with  ] 1 ; 0 [ ∈ a . This seemingly complex function is nothing more than the summary of rather 
simple preferences under D = 1  and  under  D = 0.  When  D = 1,  (5)  becomes 
a a y x y x U
) 1 ( ) , , 1 (
− = , which is the standard Cobb-Douglas formulation. The optima of x and y, 
given this utility function, are x* =  w a) 1 ( − and y* = awso that 
(6) 
a a aw w a y x U ] [ ] ) 1 [( *) *, , 1 (
) 1 ( − − =  
     w a a
a a − − =
1 ) 1 (  
When D = 0, (5) becomes  x a a y x U
a a a ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , , 0 (
− − = λ  and, with x = w’ and y = 0, 
(7)  ' ) 1 ( ) 0 , ' , 0 (
1 w a a w U
a a a − − = λ  
This is also Cobb-Douglas, with one variable where the coefficient on x is 1. In this specifica-
tion λ(w’) = λ
a, which we obtain after solving for ŵ/w’ in expression (3). Willing sharers have 
λ(w’) = λ
a < 1, and thus λ < 1; reluctant sharers have λ(w’) = λ
a > 1, and thus λ > 1. Note fur-
ther that, under D = 1, the allocation of w to x and y does not depend on λ. Agents with equal 
a share the same amount aw, when placed into a sharing environment, though those with λ > 1 
are reluctant sharers and those with λ < 1 are willing sharers. 
Proposition 1 (cf. Prediction 2): The lowest endowment ŵ, at which reluctant sharers enter 
the sharing environment increases in a. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The endowment ŵ at which agents are indifferent between the two 
environments is defined by (3). Comparing (6) to (7), this implies 
(8)  w’ = λ
a ŵ . 
Differentiating (8) with respect to a shows that ŵ is increasing in a.  49
Appendix 2 – A re-examination of Broberg et al’s data 
 
We reanalyze data from Broberg et al.s’ (2007) experiment, in light of our three predictions. 
Their data allows an analysis of the likely composition of the sharing environment, based on 
individuals’ preferences and on whether there is a cost or subsidy to entering the environment. 
Such an analysis, however, is not reported in their paper. Therefore, our re-examination of 
their data, in conjunction with the results we report in our paper, yield complementary evi-
dence supporting our novel predictions (i.e., Predictions 2 and 3). Moreover, since the proce-
dures used in their experiments differ substantially from ours and their experiments were con-
ducted in Sweden, this section demonstrates the robustness of our findings to alternative pro-
cedures and populations. 
Description of Broberg et al.’s experiment 
 
In Broberg et al.’s experiment, 119 subjects participated in a two-part experiment. In the first, 
part, each subject played a dictator game in which they allocated SEK 100 (w, approximately 
$14) between themselves and another anonymous student at the same university in Stock-
holm. We refer to the allocation to the other player as a. In the second part, subjects indicated 
a reservation price to exit the game (p
*). Following Becker et al.’s (1964) mechanism for in-
centive-compatible value elicitation, the experimenter then randomly drew a price (p). If the 
randomly-drawn price was equal to or higher than the elicited price (p ≥ p
*), the subject re-
ceived p and did not play the dictator game. Otherwise, the subject played the dictator game. 
Using our classification of social-preference types, we can classify subjects as either 
non-sharers (a = 0), willing sharers (a > 0, p
* > w), or reluctant sharers (a > 0, p
* < w). In what 
follows, we assume that those who are indifferent at a given price will opt out. 
Prediction 1 
Prediction 1 states that the introduction of a costless sorting option decreases the aggregate 
amount shared. This is equivalent to positing the presence of reluctant sharers in the popula-
tion, since they will always share less when costless sorting is available.  
In Broberg et al.’s data, the 119 subjects share on average SEK 27.15 when there is no 
sorting option, but aggregate sharing declines to SEK 5.16 per subject when sorting is avail-
able. This difference is highly statistically significant (t118 = 10.50, p < 0.001). Thus costless 
sorting leads to significantly less sharing, as we predict and also find in our experiments. 
Interestingly, and as we also find in our experiments, sharing conditional on entering 
the sharing environment is higher for those who choose to enter when entry is costless, i.e., 
willing sharers (SEK 34.11), than it is for the population as a whole. 
 
Prediction 2 
Prediction 2 states that introducing a subsidy increases aggregate sharing because more reluc-
tant sharers are attracted into the sharing environment. At the same time, the subsidy primar-
ily attract non-sharers and those reluctant sharers who share the least. Thus, under relative 
sharing aversion, low subsidies lead to lower average sharing among those who enter, than 
when there is no subsidy (we find this to be the case in our Experiment 3). 
Table A2.1 below reports the amount shared, by those who would enter the sharing 
environment based on their reservation price, for different values of the outside option at or 
below the value of the endowment (w’ ≤ w). Entry is subsidized whenever the outside option 
yields a smaller payoff than the endowment (w’ < w).    50
As the table reveals, very few enter when there is no subsidy (15%), but those who do 
enter share a large amount (34.11). The introduction of a small subsidy (w’ = 90) attracts 
more people but decreases average sharing among those who enter. The relationship in the 
table is clearly the one we predicted – those who are first attracted by subsidies are those who 
share smaller amounts. For example, the 26 people who re-enter when w’ = 90, share only 
13.12 on average. More generally, we expect a negative correlation between reservation price 
and amount shared, but only for those who opt out when sorting is costless (w = w’). (Broberg 
et al. report only the correlation for their entire sample, which is 0.069 and statistically insig-
nificant.) We find that the correlation for those with reservation prices of 100 or below is 
negative and statistically significant, as we predicted (-0.35, p < 0.001). 
 
Table A2.1.  Amount shared conditional on entry when entry into sharing environment 
is subsidized 
 
Value of outside option 
(w’) 
Number (percentage) 
choosing to enter 
Mean amount shared 
by entrants 
No sorting  119 (100%)  27.15 
100 18  (15%)  34.11 
90 44  (37%)  21.70 
80 53  (45%)  20.85 
70 64  (54%)  22.89 
60 73  (61%)  24.12 
50 79  (66%)  24.63 
40 109  (92%)  26.22 
30 112  (94%)  27.19 
20 112  (94%)  27.19 
10 115  (97%)  27.27 
 
Prediction 3 
Finally, our third prediction deals with costly entry into the sharing environment.  Here, we 
predict that fewer people will enter, but that those who enter will share more than the popula-
tion as a whole. 
We first consider an entry cost of 10 percent of the endowment (SEK 10), correspond-
ing to the design of our Experiment 4. As shown in Figure A2.1 below, the results are virtu-
ally identical to the results in our paper; cf. Figure 4 in our paper. 
More generally, we explore the extent to which Prediction 3 holds for alternate entry 
costs. Table A2.2 below reports outcomes as entry becomes costly (w < w’). As we predicted, 
costly entry leads to significantly fewer people opting in to the sharing environment. But 
those who enter share large amounts. For example, those who are willing to forego SEK 150 
in order to play the SEK 100 dictator game share 49 percent of the endowment, which is 
higher than for any other subset of the population. This is consistent with the fact that, for 
willing sharers, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between amount 
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Figure A2.1: Effects of 10 percent entry cost on overall sharing and sharing conditional 






Table A2.2.  Amount shared conditional on entry when entry into sharing environment 
is costly 
 
Value of outside option 
(w’) 
Number (percentage) 
choosing to enter 
Mean amount shared 
by entrants 
No sorting  119 (100%)  27.15 
100 18  (15%)  34.11 
110 14  (12%)  37.79 
120 12  (10%)  43.25 
130 12  (10%)  43.25 
140 12  (10%)  43.25 
150 6  (5%)  49.00 
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Appendix 3: Sample Instructions for Experiment 1 (Between-Subjects Design) 
The text in brackets and in italics appears only in treatments with sorting option. 
 
General Instructions 
Thank you for attending the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people 
make decisions. During the session, you are not permitted to talk or communicate with the 
other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to answer it. 
During the session you will earn money. Everyone will receive €5 for their participa-
tion, which will be the minimum compensation for everyone. In addition, there exists a possi-
bility that some may earn more money. At the end of the session the quantity that you have 
earned will be paid to you in cash. The payments are confidential; we will not inform any of 
the other participants of the quantity that you earn. 
In a moment, you will receive an envelope. Once everyone has received an envelope, 
you may open it and you will see a card with a number. This is your identification number for 
the experiment. After looking at it, please keep this number since it will be used during the 
experiment. This number is private and should not be shared with anybody else. 
In a moment, I will ask that all of the participants with even numbers, meaning 2, 4, 6, 
8, etc., follow me outside this room. These participants will go to an adjacent area, where they 
will complete a brief questionnaire, and will receive the €5 payment from the experimenter 
for their participation. When leaving the room, please take all of your belongings. 
 
 
Instructions for participants with odd numbers 
In this experiment, each of you will [decide whether to participate or not] participate in an 
activity. [That is, participating in the activity is optional]. The activity is the following: 
The activity: You will be paired with one of the participants who just left this room. 
That is, each of you will be paired with one of the participants with an even number (2, 
4, 6,…). The pairings will be made randomly and anonymously, which means that no-
body will know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired. You will have 
to decide how to distribute €10 between yourself and the person with whom you are 
paired. That is, you will decide how much money, between €0.00 and €10.00, to give to 
the other person and how much to keep for yourself. For example, you may decide to 
give €9.00 to the other person and keep €1.00 for yourself, or you may instead decide to 
give €1.00 to the other person and keep €9.00 for yourself. You may select any distribu-
tion of the €10 between yourself and the other person, in increments of €0.10. The as-
signed amounts will be paid to you and to the other person (in addition to the €5 for par-
ticipation). 
Are there questions about the activity? 
The participants in the adjacent area do not know anything about this activity. They received a 
questionnaire and were asked to complete it.  
[You must decide whether to participate or not participate in the activity. 
•  If you opt to participate in the activity, you will be paired with one of the other partici-
pants and will distribute the €10 between yourself and this participant.] At the conclusion   53
of the session the participant with whom you are paired will reenter this room and I will 
explain the activity to him or her. This participant will then discover how much money he 
or she received from you and how much you kept for yourself. You and the other partici-
pant will receive these quantities, plus the €5 for participation. 
•  [If you opt not to participate in the activity you will not be paired with any other partici-
pant and you will not distribute any money. In this case you will receive a fixed amount of 
€10 (plus the €5 for participation), but you will not have the option to distribute this 
money. At the conclusion of the session, I will go to the adjacent area and I will pay €5 to 
the people who are not paired with anyone in this room. These people will not receive any 
information about the activity.] 
This session will now proceed as follows:  
1)  Each of you has an envelope […two envelopes: one labeled “participate” and another 
“don’t participate”]. Please do not open this envelope [either envelope] yet. 
2)  [If you decide to not participate in the activity, you will open the envelope labeled “don’t 
participate.” Inside this envelope is a sheet. Once you open the envelope, you will remove 
the sheet and write your participant number in the indicated space. You will receive €10. 
3)  If you decide to participate in the activity, you will open the envelope labeled “partici-
pate.”] Inside the envelope is a sheet with the number of the participant with whom you 
are paired and on which you will indicate how to distribute the €10 between the other per-
son and yourself. Once you open the envelope, you will remove the sheet and will write 
your participant number in the indicated space. In addition you should look over the sheet 
to see the number of the participant with whom you are paired. You should then indicate 
how you wish to distribute the €10 between the other participant and yourself. The total of 
the two quantities should sum to exactly 10.00. If they do not sum to 10.00, then the other 
participant will receive the amount that you specify and you will receive the remainder. 
4)  [In either case,] Once you finish, place the sheet back in the envelope and I will collect 
the envelopes. 
At the end of the session, we will do the following: 
5)  The experimenter will go to the adjacent area and will bring the other participants. […only 
those participants who are paired with someone who opted to participate in the activity. 
The rest of the participants in the adjacent area will not be paired, will receive the €5 for 
their participation and for them the experiment will have concluded. 
6)  If you opted to participate in the activity, the participant with whom you are paired will 
reenter this room and will …] These participants will receive a brief explanation of the ac-
tivity. The participant with whom you are paired will receive the sheet that you com-
pleted, indicating how much money he or she received from you, out of the €10. 
7)  The experimenter will then anonymously pay the other participants [who are paired with 
someone in this room] their total earnings, and will then pay you anonymously. This will 
conclude the experiment. 
Are there questions? Once we answer any questions we will proceed to open the envelopes. 
[Please open only one of the two envelopes.]   54
Decision sheet 
Number of the person with whom you are paired:        __________ 
Your number (please write your number in the space on the right): __________ 
Amount of money to give to the other person:        €_____.____ 
(in €0.10 increments) 
Amount of money to keep for yourself:          €_____.____ 
(in €0.10 increments) 
(These two quantities must sum to €10.00) 
 
Decision sheet 
You have opted to not participate in the activity. You will not be paired with another participant. 
At the end of the session, you will receive €10 plus the €5 for participation. 
Your number (please write your number in the space on the right): __________ 
 
Instructions for participants with even numbers 
During the next few minutes, please complete the questionnaire on the attached sheet. After fin-
ishing, please wait a few minutes quietly for me to return. At that time, I will pay you the €5. In 
addition, it is possible that I will require the participation of some of you for a brief additional 
activity in the session. 
While you wait, you may complete the payment receipt. Please leave the amount blank. 
 
Final information for participants with even numbers 
While you were out of this room, [some of] the participants here participated in an activity in 
which they distributed €10 between themselves and one of you. You are paired with one of these 
participants. This other participant decided how much money, from €0.00 to €10.00, to give to 
you and how much to keep for him- or herself. In a moment you will see a sheet on which this 
participant has indicated how much money to give to you. This amount, along with the €5 for 
participation, will be your payment for this session. 
 